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Collective management organisations have been widely lauded for their efficiency and 
near elimination of the transaction costs on the part of the rights holders that would 
otherwise be incurred in exploitation of copyright and related rights. However, when 
it comes to compulsory collective management/administration of copyright and 
related rights, questions have been raised about the implications on the freedom of 
association and the right to property.
The purpose of this project was to look into the human rights repercussions of 
compulsory collective management of copyright and related rights in general and the 
constitutionality of Section 30A in particular.  The human rights in focus were the 
freedom of association and the right to property.  The project proceeded from the 
normative framework of collective management organisations (CMOs) in general, the 
freedom of association and the right to property, looking into both local and 
international instruments. On establishing how compulsory collective management of 
rights, the freedom of association and the right to property interact, the limits and 
incentives of the allowable limitations on these rights for the sake of compulsory 
collective management of rights were discussed. Section 30A of the Copyright Act 
was then examined in this context in a bid to determine its permissibility in the face 
of the legal, political and cultural realities in Kenya. Two judgments that have been 
made so far on the constitutionality of Section 30A were used as tools of analysis. 
The study was mainly done through desk research. It established that due to the public 
participation aspect that was lacking in Section 30A, it is unconstitutional as it violates 
Article 118 of the constitution of Kenya, but would have otherwise been an allowable 
limitation on the right to property and freedom of association, considering the realities 
of Kenya’s creative sector and level of development. The study recommends 
amendments to the law to strengthen regulation of CMOs, as well as the enactment of 
a Performers’ Rights Act.
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A collective management organisation (CMO), or a collecting society, as per Section 48 of the 
Copyright Act of Kenya, is “an organisation which has as its main object, or one of its main 
objects, the negotiating for the collection and distribution of royalties and the granting of 
licenses in respect of copyright works or performer’s rights”. These are usually not-for-profit 
organisations.1 CMOs are especially useful in reducing transaction costs; those of contracting, 
price setting, search and information costs.2 
In looking at the focus of this paper, performers’ rights, we would need to first consider the 
distinction between copyright and related rights (which include performers’ rights). One could 
say that copyright generally goes to composers and authors whereas related rights go to 
performers, producers and broadcasting organisations.3 The former produce literary and artistic 
works, considered so regardless of merit.4 The latter, though producing work not qualifying for 
copyright protection in the strict sense, produce work with sufficient creativity, or technical or 
organisational skill to qualify for “copyright-like” rights.5 They enable work subject to 
copyright to be made to the public and so related rights; rights related to copyright, accrue to 
them.6
I will look briefly at the history of related rights. It could be traced to some less “respected” 
form of works subject to copyright. Photographs, in some quarters in the past, were thought to 
be merely products of mechanical processes, rather than due to the creative prowess of the 
photographer, and motion films the result of corporate organisations’ work rather than the 
‘labours of individual authors’, and so there was some resistance to according these authors’ 
rights.7 However, after pushing and pulling, these rights were accorded to filmmakers and 
photographers in civil law countries, but the line was drawn here—performances, sound 
recordings, broadcasts and phonograms were not to be included.8 It was a bit like saying “see, 
we have made enough compromise; ask us for no more.” Even so, a new regime of rights was 
1 Sigei E, ‘The History and Future of Collective Management Organisations’ 8 Copyright News (2012)
2 Panda A and Patel A, ‘Role of Collective Management Organisations for the Protection of Performers’ Rights 
in the Music Industry: In the Era of  Digitalization’ 15 The Journal of World Intellectual Property (2012) 155-
170
3 World Intellectual Property Organisation, Understanding Copyright and Related Rights
4 World Intellectual Property Organisation, Understanding Copyright and Related Rights
5 World Intellectual Property Organisation, Understanding Copyright and Related Rights
6 World Intellectual Property Organisation, Understanding Copyright and Related Rights
7 Goldstein P, International copyright: principles, law and practice, Oxford University Press, 2001, 10
8 Goldstein P, International copyright: principles, law and practice, 10
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to be created for these ‘left out’ fields. This regime would be in neighbouring rights—droits 
voisins in France, diritti connessi in Italy and Leistungsschutzrechte in Germany.9 
In terms of protection, authors and composers have enjoyed protection of their rights for a 
longer period than performers and producers.10 Unlike the case of composers and authors 
(whose protection in international law was established by 1886 with the Berne Convention), 
related rights were first internationally recognised in 1961 with the Rome Convention. Things 
are changing and more prominence is being given to the role of performers and producers. As 
Javier Bardem, a Spanish actor, said at the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) 
in 2011, “Since the first actor took off his mask…, the actors who have succeeded him have no 
longer been considered as mere instruments or puppets, fully entering into the temple of Thalia 
as creators.”11 The law can be seen to be working in line with the realization that performers 
are just as indispensable as the authors. After 1960, still on the international sphere, we have 
further development on the recognition and remuneration rights of related rights holders 
through the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) in 1996. 
In Kenya, these attempts to properly recognize and remunerate the performer could be seen to 
have led to the introduction of Section 30A of the Copyright Act of Kenya, which in promoting 
these rights, involves the aforementioned CMOs rather heavily. Section 30A provides for the 
right to equitable remuneration for use of sound recordings and audio visual works. To this 
end, it stipulates that if a sound recording is published for commercial purposes or a 
reproduction of such recording is used directly for broadcasting or other communication to the 
public, or is publicly performed, a single equitable remuneration for the performer and the 
producer of the sound recording shall be paid by the user through the respective CMO, and the 
remuneration shall be shared equally between the producer of the sound recording and the 
performer. Furthermore, if a fixation of a performance is published for commercial purposes 
or a reproduction of a fixation of a performance is used for broadcasting or other 
communication to the public, or is publicly performed, a single equitable remuneration for the 
performer shall be paid by the user to the CMO. 
The situation prior to this section would be, for example, that an upcoming artiste would want 
to get a song out and so approach a producer, but because the performer had the short end of 
9 Goldstein P, International copyright: principles, law and practice, 10
10 Towse R, ‘The Singer or the Song – Developments in Performers’ Rights From the Perspective of a Cultural 
Economist’ Review of Law and Economics (2007) 745
11 ‘Performers’ Rights – Background Brief’ (World Intellectual Property Organisation) 
http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/briefs/performers.html on 18 February 2016
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the stick in terms of bargaining power, the performer would accept one-off remuneration that 
would sometimes turn out to be very low in comparison with the success of the song.12 
However, because of Section 30A performer has to get a part of the remuneration each time 
their performance in the sound recording or some other fixation is made publicly available, 
regardless of what the contractual terms between the performer and producer were. This 
therefore mitigates the injustices that often come about due to the lower bargaining power of 
the performer. In this sense, therefore, Section 30A is a great benefit for performers.
Nonetheless, Section 30A is not without its challenges. This single equitable remuneration is 
to be paid to the respective CMO, which could be taken to mean that any performer or producer 
wishing to get this single equitable remuneration needs to be a part of a CMO. This raises 
human rights and effectively constitutional questions. The freedom of association is captured 
in Article 36 of the Constitution of Kenya, and the issue posed by Section 30A can be 
specifically challenged by Article 36(2), which provides that a person shall not be compelled 
to join an association of any sort. 
Furthermore, one could also use Article 40 on the right to property to challenge the 
constitutionality of Section 30A. Section 30A could be said to be undermining people’s right 
to their intellectual property in the sense that my right to negotiate on how much I am paid 
directly with the user of my work and exploit my property in sound recordings and fixations of 
performances is taken from me by virtue of Section 30A. Section 30A narrows down the 
negotiation to be just between the CMO and the user. It also does not allow a person to let their 
property be freely enjoyed by his/her users under a free licence if he so wishes; because this 
remuneration is compulsorily paid to the CMO. The rights holder features nowhere in the 
negotiation of payment.
The effect on the right to enjoy one’s property can be seen in the contractual issues that have 
arisen. Section 30A provides that sound recordings that have been made available to the public 
in such a way as to enable the public to access this at a place and time of their own choosing 
will be considered to be publishing for commercial purposes and a single equitable 
remuneration would need to be paid. This would therefore bring in ringtone downloads and 
music available for downloading from websites. Matters that were previously dealt with as 
between content service providers (CSPs) and telecommunications companies, for instance, 
12 ‘IFPI attacking performers’ remuneration rights’ FIM, 21 May 2015, https://www.fim-musicians.org/ifpi-
kenya-copyright-act, on 12 January 2017
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will now necessarily involve CMOs.13 CSPs would initially contract with the rights holders, 
and then contract with telecommunications companies, but now the telecommunications 
companies are statutorily compelled to pay CMOs. Therefore, contractual issues come into 
play as the telecommunications company, for instance, will not see the need to pay the CSP for 
the music if they are now statutorily compelled to pay the CMOs as was the case in some of 
the cases discussed in this study.
Whether or not these are allowable limitations of the right to property and freedom of 
association will be part of the analysis to be undertaken in this paper.
Section 30A does try to achieve justice for the owners of related rights in music, but it is worth 
considering whether it is constitutional, and whether it in actual fact benefits the owners of 
related rights or if there could have been a better way to achieve the same ends.
Statement of Problem
The problem that arises is the constitutionality of Section 30A, in as far as it seems to compel 
rights holders to join CMOs in order to get their remuneration, a limitation on both the freedom 
of association and the right to property.
Justification of Study
The study is important in determining the status of (in terms of constitutionality) and therefore 
the way forward with regard to Section 30A.
Statement of Objectives
This paper will analyse the constitutionality of Section 30A. 
It will also assess the suitability of compulsory collective management of rights in Kenya.
Research Questions
The research questions are as follows:
Is Section 30A unconstitutional?
Is compelling a rights-holder to join a CMO in order to collect their equitable remuneration 
constitutional?
Are there better ways to achieve the same goal of ensuring the enforcement of related rights?
13 Xpedia Management Limited & 4 others v AG & 4 others [2016] eKLR
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Literature Review
There exists a large amount of resources on the role of CMOs worldwide as well as on related 
rights. I will be informed by these resources, some highlighted below, and build on them as 
well. However, there is scarce information on Section 30A in particular, and the discussions 
on this section are all in the form of blog posts and case law.
Laurence Helfer has studied the interaction of collective management of copyright and human 
rights.14 He has pointed out the cases in which compulsory management of copyright and 
related rights may be justified, and his work will be the base on which I determine suitability 
of compulsory collective management of copyright and related rights.
Dr Silke Lewinski has also discussed the issue of the permissibility of mandatory collective 
management/administration of exclusive rights.15 She considers the grounds on which CMOs 
in general and compulsory collective management of rights in particular are usually 
challenged—for instance, possibility of abuse of monopoly and the minimisation of the ability 
of authors to explore their rights through contracting with other businesses, but points out 
findings that show that CMOs barely have an impact on competition, are usually regulated 
quite heavily and that CMOs might actually give authors better remuneration options than 
businesses.
Ruth Towse has written on the developments in performers’ rights.16 She points out that in the 
United Kingdom, before 1996, remuneration on performers’ rights had been paid collectively 
to the Musicians’ Union, (as is the case now with Section 30A) but post-1996, rights are 
distributed on an individual basis.17 She discusses the European Commission Rental Directive, 
stating that its drafters “evidently believed that one of the roles of…related rights registration 
was to correct the weaker bargaining position of the non-featured performers and that one way 
to do this was to require that equitable remuneration could only be administered by a collective 
society set up for that purpose.”18 This paper will be considering whether, in the face of the 
low bargaining power she speaks about, mandatory collective administration is the way to go 
for us.
14 Helfer L, ‘Collective management of copyrights and human rights: an uneasy alliance revisited’, in Gervais D 
(ed), Collective management of copyright and related rights, 2nd ed, Kluwer Law International BV, The 
Netherlands, 75
15 Lewinski S, ‘Mandatory collective administration of exclusive rights – a case study on its compatibility with 
international law’ UNESCO E-Copyright Bulletin (January-March 2004)
16 Towse R, ‘The Singer or the Song’ 745
17 Towse R, ‘The Singer or the Song’ 749
18 Towse R, ‘The Singer or the Song’ 750
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Aurobinda Panda and Atul Patel have discussed the role of CMOs in the protection of 
performers’ rights in the music industry.19 They recognize the status of CMOs as necessary for 
efficient administration of copyright and related rights, and the numerous benefits accruing to 
rights-holders through them and call for enhanced protection of related rights in India.20 I will 
be looking at the situation in Kenya and whether this enhanced protection might serves its ends, 
and under what conditions. 
When it comes to Section 30A itself, much of the discussion on it has been done through blog 
posts. Judy Chebet, a lawyer, has made one of the significant contributions to the discussion 
on Section 30A.21 She sees Section 30A as the introduction into the Copyright Act of the 
contents of Article 15 of the WPPT.22 She goes on to show how Section 30A differs from 
Article 15 of the WPPT. First, payment through the CMOs (effectively compelling rights 
holders to be members of CMOs) is not contained in Article 15. This, she points out, disables 
the rights holder from getting his/her payment directly from the user or content service 
provider, which was not the import of Article 15 of the WPPT. She highlights how this would 
possibly compromise one’s right to enjoy his/her property and protection from deprivation of 
property. This paper will therefore be going forward to examine whether Section 30A may fall 
into allowable limitations of constitutionally secured rights. Furthermore, she points out the 
lack of guidelines on remuneration in Section 30A, and contrasts this to the ‘fair compensation’ 
to be decided on by the CMOs in conjunction with the manufacturers and producers of audio-
visual recording equipment (failing which, the role goes to the Copyright Tribunal) as provided 
in Section 30(6) of the Copyright Act. This paper will be examining whether Section 30A is 
backed by sufficient regulatory measures on remuneration.
Victor Nzomo has also addressed the issue of Section 30A.23 He argues that taking into 
consideration the uses to which sound recordings and fixations are traditionally put, collective 
19 Panda A and Patel A, ‘Role of Collective Management Organisations for the Protection of Performers’ Rights 
in the Music Industry’ 155-170
20 Panda A and Patel A, ‘Role of Collective Management Organisations for the Protection of Performers’ Rights 
in the Music Industry’166
21 Judy Chebet, ‘Section 30A of the Copyright Act: What’s That About?’ (Judy Chebet, 26 February 2014) 
https://judychebet.wordpress.com/2014/02/26/section-30a-of-the-copyright-act-whats-that-about/ on February 
19, 2016
22 Article 15 of the WPPT provides that contracting parties may establish in their national legislation that the 
single equitable remuneration shall be claimed from the user by the performer by the producer of a phonogram 
or by both. It also provides that contracting parties may enact national legislation that, in the absence of an 
agreement between the performer and producer of a phonogram, sets the terms according to which performers 
and producers of phonograms shall share the single equitable remuneration.
23 Victor Nzomo, ‘Revisiting Section 30A of the Copyright Act: Right to Equitable Remuneration for Performers 
and Producers’ https://ipkenya.wordpress.com/2014/02/28/revisiting-section-30a-of-the-copyright-act-right-to-
equitable-remuneration-for-performers-and-producers/ on February, 19 2016
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management is indispensable for remuneration of performers. He does agree with Ms Chebet 
that Article 15 of the WPPT does not allow compulsory licensing but disagrees that this is not 
an allowable limitation, per Article 24 of the Constitution. He also explores compulsory 
licences, a household concept in the world of patent, and how they apply in the world of 
copyright and related rights. He talks about the 3 step test for compulsory licensing enshrined 
in Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention—exceptional circumstances, no conflict with the 
normal exploitation of the work and no unreasonable prejudice to the legitimate interests of the 
work. He says that only if it is proven that Section 30A goes against Article 9(2) of the Berne 
Convention and the allowable limitations under Article 24 of the Constitution of Kenya can 
Ms Chebet’s argument hold. This paper will analyse whether the compulsory licence in Section 
30A adheres to the 3 step test in the Berne Convention.
Mr Nzomo goes on to point out that the bigger question is the regulatory regime of Section 
30A particularly with regard to remuneration. This paper will therefore go into examining Mr 
Nzomo’s position that the regulation is the bigger problem within the scope of examining the 
import of the right to property. 
This paper will be building on these arguments, from the background level of CMOs and their 
normative framework to the status that Section 30A gives them as organisations that one must 
join in order to get remuneration, and the constitutionality of this. 
Hypothesis
This study proceeds on the presumption that the implied requirement by the Copyright Act at 
Section 30A that rights-holders must be part of CMOs to get their remuneration infringes the 
freedom of association protected by Article 36 of the Constitution, and the right to one’s 
property under Article 40, but is allowable. 
Assumptions
It is assumed that compulsory management of copyright and related rights is a prima facie 
violation of the right to property and freedom of association, but may be allowable.
Research Design and Methodology
My research will be based on the normative framework for CMOs, the freedom of association 
and the right to property. Through this—that is, determining how the three concepts interact, I 
will mainly apply desktop research to determine the constitutionality of Section 30A. 
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Limitations
This study will be limited to analysis of the role of CMOs with regard to copyright and related 
rights, vis-à-vis Section 30A. The constitutional rights and freedoms this paper will focus on 
are the freedom of association and right to property. 
Chapter Breakdown
This research paper will be structured as follows:
Chapter 1: Introduction
Chapter 2: Normative Framework for Collective Management Organisations, Freedom of 
Associations and the Right to Property
Chapter 3: The Section 30A Judgments
Chapter 4: Suitability of Compulsory Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights 
in Kenya
Chapter 5: Conclusion and Recommendations
Timeline/Duration
This study will take place from April 2016 to January 2017.
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Chapter Two: Normative Framework for Collective Management 
Organisations, Freedom of Association and the Right to Property
Introduction 
In this chapter, I will examine the meaning of collective management organisations, freedom 
of association, the right to property and how these interact. 
Collective Management Organisations
Definition and History
It has been noted that the cost of identifying owners of copyright and negotiating licences with 
them often exceeds the value of the intended use of the copyrighted work.24 To enable 
licensing, something needed to be done to lower the costs of transaction to below the value of 
the intended use of the work.25 The historical response to this problem has been the collective 
management organisation (CMO), also known as a collecting society.26 Collective 
management of rights comes about where individual exercise would either be too costly or 
impossible, and in other cases where it is simply obligatory by law.27 It allows authors, 
performers and publishers to concentrate on their creative activity and have another body taking 
care of delivering their remuneration to them wherever their works might be used all over the 
world.28 This kind of assurance of remuneration encourages the development of the creative 
sector. The remuneration of producers and publishers is their return on their investment in 
creatives.29 CMOs also assist in enforcement of rights through the courts.30 They can bring 
actions in their own name for infringement of copyright and related rights.31
CMOs work by collecting vast libraries of a specific type of copyrighted work, offering blanket 
licences of certain rights to these works and then distributing the licence fees among the 
respective copyright owners who belong to the collective.32 These organisations also assist in 
24 Goldstein P and Hugenholtz B, International copyright: principles, law and practice, 275
25 Goldstein P and Hugenholtz B, International copyright: principles, law and practice, 275
26 Goldstein P and Hugenholtz B, International copyright: principles, law and practice, 275
27 Lewinski S, ‘International copyright law and policy’, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, 61
28 World Intellectual Property Organisation, Educational material on collective management of copyright and 
related rights, August 31 2012, 19
29 World Intellectual Property Organisation, Educational material on collective management of copyright and 
related rights, August 31 2012, 19
30 World Intellectual Property Organisation, Educational material on collective management of copyright and 
related rights, August 31 2012, 20
31 World Intellectual Property Organisation, Educational material on collective management of copyright and 
related rights, August 31 2012, 20
32 Goldstein P and Hugenholtz B, International copyright: principles, law and practice, 275
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the handling of orphan works.33 Orphan works are works which are still subject to copyright 
protection but whose owners cannot be reasonably traced.34 
Dealing in copyrighted works has been further complicated by the internet, with the 
“explosion” of individualised uses of works subject to copyright.35 Put differently, use of 
copyrighted works has been even further decentralised by it, making the need for CMOs seem 
even more necessary.36 However, the internet has also showed great potential in terms of 
possibilities for individual management of copyrighted works through the pay-per-use music 
and video distribution services available on it.37 Other opportunities for individualised 
management of rights have also arisen due to the internet.38
CMOs go back to the eighteenth century in France, with the collecting agency for authors which 
eventually became the Société des Auteurs et Compositeurs Dramatiques (SACD).39 Half a 
century later, France also gave rise to the Société des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Editeurs de 
Musique (SACEM) whose work was to license, collect and distribute revenue under the right 
of musical performance.40 SACEM is still one of the most formidable forces worldwide when 
it comes to collective administration of the rights of authors.41 Musical performing rights 
societies are, overall, the highest in number and perhaps most powerful in terms of the 
formation of copyright policy.42 The rights licensed by CMOs include performance, 
broadcasting, photocopying, droit de suite, graphic reproduction, cable retransmission, public 
lending, mechanical reproduction, digital archiving rights, making available online and online 
streaming rights.43 For instance, in Finland, Kopiosto handles photocopying rights for literary 
works,44 while in Kenya KOPIKEN does the same job.45 Other CMOs handle several of these 
rights, like Belgium’s SABAM—the Belgian Association of Authors, Composers and 
Publishers.46 Even if SABAM is mainly associated with music, it also protects photographers, 
painters, filmmakers, scriptwriters, graphic artists, journalists, cartoonists, novelists, poets, 
33 Goldstein P and Hugenholtz B, International copyright: principles, law and practice, 275
34 Goldstein P and Hugenholtz B, International copyright: principles, law and practice, 275
35 Goldstein P and Hugenholtz B, International copyright: principles, law and practice, 275
36 Goldstein P and Hugenholtz B, International copyright: principles, law and practice, 276
37 Goldstein P and Hugenholtz B, International copyright: principles, law and practice, 275
38 Helfer L, ‘Collective management of copyrights and human rights: an uneasy alliance revisited’,  95
39 Goldstein P and Hugenholtz B, International copyright: principles, law and practice, 276
40 Goldstein P and Hugenholtz B, International copyright: principles, law and practice, 276
41 Goldstein P and Hugenholtz B, International copyright: principles, law and practice, 276
42 Goldstein P and Hugenholtz B, International copyright: principles, law and practice, 276
43 Goldstein P and Hugenholtz B, International copyright: principles, law and practice, 276
44 Goldstein P and Hugenholtz B, International copyright: principles, law and practice, 276
45 ‘The Reproduction Rights Society of Kenya’, Kopiken, http://www.kopiken.org/, on 4 January 2017
46 Goldstein P and Hugenholtz B, International copyright: principles, law and practice, 276
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dialogue writers, sculptors, choreographers, playwrights, translators, subtitle authors, 
illustrators, among others.47 
Internationally, there are four umbrella organisations for CMOs. The largest of these is the 
Confédération Internationale des Sociétés d’Auteurs et Compositeurs (CISAC), which brings 
together 239 collective management organisations, drawn from 123 countries, covering a wide 
array of copyrighted works.48 Membership of CISAC presupposes compliance with the 
universally accepted rules of collective management as well as the Professional Rules and 
Binding Resolutions of the Confederation.49 Kenya’s MCSK is a part of CISAC.50 Some other 
African countries with societies that are part of CISAC include South Africa (through DALRO, 
for literature), Morocco (through BMDA, for music), Cameroon (through SOCILADRA, for 
drama), among many others.51 The vast majority of African societies that are part of CISAC 
are societies that are catering to musical works, with only SOCILADRA and DALRO as the 
exceptions, as at January 2015.52 
Another umbrella society is the Bureau International des Sociétés Gérant les Droits 
d’Enregistrement et de Reproduction Mécanique (BIEM), which works with societies 
administering recording and mechanical production rights.53 Kenya’s MCSK is a non-voting 
society in BIEM.54
The International Federation of Phonogram and Videogram Producers (IFPI) acts as the 
principal trade association of phonogram and videogram producers.55 It assists in the 
coordination of CMOs’ activities in neighbouring rights in phonograms and videograms.56 It 
has 1300 members in 60 countries.57 AI Records in Kenya is a member of IFPI, though it is not 
a CMO.58
47 ‘Who are we?’ SABAM, http://www.sabam.be/en/sabam/who-are-we, on 4 January 2017
48 Goldstein P and Hugenholtz B, International copyright: principles, law and practice, 277, see also (for 
updated statistics) ‘Our members’, CISAC, http://www.cisac.org/Our-Members, accessed on 4 January 2017
49 ‘Our members’, CISAC, http://www.cisac.org/Our-Members, accessed on 4 January 2017
50 ‘Our members’, CISAC, http://www.cisac.org/Our-Members, accessed on 4 January 2017
51 ‘Our members’, CISAC, http://www.cisac.org/Our-Members, accessed on 4 January 2017
52 ‘Our members’, CISAC, http://www.cisac.org/Our-Members, accessed on 4 January 2017
53 Goldstein P and Hugenholtz B, International copyright: principles, law and practice, 277
54 ‘Societies: MCSK (non-voting society)’, BIEM, 
http://www.biem.org/index.php?option=com_licensing&view=societes&Itemid=539&lang=en, accessed on 4 
January 2017
55 Goldstein P and Hugenholtz B, International copyright: principles, law and practice, 277
56 Goldstein P and Hugenholtz B, International copyright: principles, law and practice, 277
57 ‘Members’, IFPI, http://www.ifpi.org/members.php, on 4 January 2017
58 ‘Our members’, IFPI, http://ifpi.org/our-members.php, on 4 January 2017
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The International Federation of Reproduction Rights Organisations (IFRRO) deals with 
coordination of national collective management organisations that handle reprographic rights.59 
Kenya’s KOPIKEN is a member of IFRRO.60 
CMOs need to have licences, partial assignments or powers of attorney from authors and rights 
holders.61 CMOs, for their effectiveness, need to represent either all or a large number of rights 
holders in a particular category, which could explain why in some countries the law takes care 
of ensuring CMOs have these numbers.62 An example of such a law is a law providing for 
compulsory collective rights management.63 In numerous other countries, CMOs operate as 
either legal or de facto monopolies.64
CMOs interact with each other internationally through reciprocal representation agreements, 
forming their own kind of private law of copyright.65 Through reciprocal representation 
agreements, CMOs undertake to represent in their respective countries the works in the library 
of the reciprocating CMO.66 This provides for even more efficient management of rights in 
places where rights holders might have faced excessively high transaction costs in 
administering their own rights. 
International Law
National laws need to be in line with commonly accepted international and regional norms. 
With regard to copyright and related rights, the main treaties of interest are the Rome 
Convention, the Berne Convention, the TRIPS Agreement, the WPPT, the WIPO Copyright 
Treaty, and the Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances (not yet in force). However, there 
are no provisions directly governing collective management in any of these; the enjoyment and 
exercise of copyright and related rights are in the purview of national law.67 
One of the basic principles of collective management is national treatment, and so—with regard 
to convention provisions—foreign rights holders are to be treated in the same way as local 
59 Goldstein P and Hugenholtz B, International copyright: principles, law and practice, 277
60 ‘RROs’, IFRRO, https://www.ifrro.org/prod/drupal/rro on 4 January 2017
61 Goldstein P and Hugenholtz B, International copyright: principles, law and practice, 277
62 Goldstein P and Hugenholtz B, International copyright: principles, law and practice, 277
63 Goldstein P and Hugenholtz B, International copyright: principles, law and practice, 277
64 Goldstein P and Hugenholtz B, International copyright: principles, law and practice, 277
65 Goldstein P and Hugenholtz B, International copyright: principles, law and practice, 277
66 Goldstein P and Hugenholtz B, International copyright: principles, law and practice, 278
67 World Intellectual Property Organisation, Educational material on collective management of copyright and 
related rights, August 31 2012, 54
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rights holders.68 This would show the advantage such organisations would have to individual 
management; a lot of negotiation costs are already catered to. 
There are various operational systems of collective management.69 These include voluntary 
collective management, collective management with legislative support (which includes the 
extended collective licence, legal presumption and obligatory collective management) and non-
voluntary collective management (which includes non-voluntary licences and private copying 
remuneration).70 When it comes to exclusive rights, licensing is usually on voluntary mandates, 
whereas when it comes to the mere right to remuneration (such as in Section 30A), considered 
“the essence of a non-voluntary licence”, the consent of the rights holders is not needed but 
they receive equitable remuneration.71 The choice of operational system depends on the 
realities of the country in question.72
When it comes to compulsory collective management, which would be considered compulsory 
licensing of copyright and related rights, it would be useful to look at the exception provided 
by Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention to determine whether it would be allowable—the test 
that Victor Nzomo suggested be used. It provides that, even though authors of literary and 
artistic works protected by the Convention have the exclusive right to authorize the 
reproduction of the works, it shall be a matter of legislation in the countries of the Union (those 
countries in which the Berne Convention applies) to permit the reproduction of the works in 
special cases, provided that such reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of 
the work and does not unnecessarily prejudice the legitimate interests of the author. If this test 
is passed, compulsory collective management of rights might be considered allowable. 
However, the use of this test has, in some quarters, been rejected.73
National Law
Turning the focus on Kenya, the Kenya Copyright Board (KECOBO) is established at Section 
3 of the Copyright Act of Kenya (2001). The functions of this board are listed at Section 5 of 
68 World Intellectual Property Organisation, Educational material on collective management of copyright and 
related rights, August 31 2012, 55
69 World Intellectual Property Organisation, Educational material on collective management of copyright and 
related rights, August 31 2012, 54
70 World Intellectual Property Organisation, Educational material on collective management of copyright and 
related rights, August 31 2012, 58
71 World Intellectual Property Organisation, Educational material on collective management of copyright and 
related rights, August 31 2012, 58
72 World Intellectual Property Organisation, Educational material on collective management of copyright and 
related rights, August 31 2012, 58
73 Lewinski S, ‘Mandatory Collective Administration of Exclusive Rights – A Case Study on its Compatibility 
with International Law’ UNESCO E-Copyright Bulletin (January-March 2004)
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the same Act. Among these functions, KECOBO is to license and supervise the activities of 
the CMOs. 
Part VII of the Copyright Act deals more thoroughly with CMOs. Copyright collecting 
societies (the CMOs) require a certificate of registration under/according to which the CMO 
will commence or carry on its business as a copyright collecting society.74 This certificate is 
valid for a year from the date of issue.75 The principal objectives of a CMO should be the 
collection and distribution of royalties and its accounts should be regularly audited by 
independent external auditors.76 As per our regime, there cannot be two or more CMOs with 
respect to the same class of rights and category of works if the one that came up first is licensed 
and works to the satisfaction of its members.77 KECOBO can de-register a CMO if it is satisfied 
that is not functioning adequately, among other reasons.78
Section 30 of the Copyright Act provides for the rights of performers. It provides that a 
performer shall have the exclusive right to broadcast his performance except in the case that 
the broadcast is made from a fixation of the performance authorised by the author. The 
performer also has the exclusive right to communicate his performance to the public except 
where the communication is made from a fixation of the performance authorised by the author 
or is made from a broadcast of the performance that has also been authorised by the author. 
Further, the performer is also entitled to the exclusive right to make a fixation of a previously 
unfixed performance, among several other rights. Section 30A lays out the interaction between 
CMOs and performers’ rights.79 
74 Section 46(1), Copyright Act (Act No. 12 of 2001)
75 Section 46(3), Copyright Act (Act No. 12 of 2001)
76 Section 46(4), Copyright Act (Act No. 12 of 2001)
77 Section 46(5), Copyright Act (Act No. 12 of 2001)
78 Section 46(9), Copyright Act (Act No. 12 of 2001)
79 Section 30A: (1)If a sound recording is published for commercial purposes or a reproduction of such recording 
is used directly for broadcasting or other communication to the public, or is publicly performed, a single equitable 
remuneration for the performer and the producer of the sound recording shall be paid by the user through the 
respective collective management organization, and the remuneration shall be shared equally between the 
producer of the sound recording and the performer. (2) If a fixation of a performance is published for commercial 
purposes or a reproduction of a fixation of a performance is used for broadcasting or other communication to the 
public, or is publicly performed, a single equitable remuneration for the performer shall be paid by the user to 
the collective management organization. (3) The right of equitable remuneration under this section shall subsist 
from the date of publication of the sound recording or fixed performance until the end of the fiftieth calendar year 
following the year of publication, provided the sound recording or fixed performance is still protected under 
section 28 and 30. (4) For the purposes of this section, sound recordings and fixations of performances that have 
been made available by wire or wireless means in such a way that members of the public may access them from 
a place and a time individually chosen by them shall be considered as if they have been published for commercial 
purposes.
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As per the Copyright Act, only one collecting society can exist in respect of the same class of 
rights and category of works.80The Performers Rights Society of Kenya (PRISK) is the CMO 
for performers in Kenya.81 It represents performers in musical and dramatic works.82 The Act 
does not define who a performer is. PRISK provides a kind of definition of performers on its 
website, and this includes singers, instrumentalists and actors.83 The International Convention 
for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organisations 
(the Rome Convention) does define the performer. Performers, per the Rome Convention, are 
actors, singers, musicians, dancers, and other persons who act, sing, deliver, declaim, play in, 
or otherwise perform literary or artistic works.84 The WPPT only slightly expands this 
definition to include performing expressions of folklore.85 The Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual 
performances also reiterates the same positon.86
Other CMOs in the country include the Music Copyright Society of Kenya (MCSK), which 
handles rights of authors, composers, arrangers and publishers of musical works,87 Kenya 
Association of Music Producers (KAMP), which handles rights of producers of sound 
recordings88 and Kopiken, which handles rights of authors (this through their respective 
organisations, for instance Kenya Non-Fiction Authors Association, Writers Association of 
Kenya, Kenya Oral Literature Association and Kenya Union of Journalists), artists and visual 
creators through the Kenya Association of Photographers, Illustrators and Designers, song 
lyricists and writers of sheet music, publishers through the Kenya Publishers Association, and 
international rights holders.89
Questions around CMOs usually involve competition issues,90 and now more frequent in our 
country, human rights issues.
80 Section 46, Copyright Act (Act No. 12 of 2001)
81 http://prisk.or.ke/corporate/about-prisk/ on 2 September 2016
82 http://prisk.or.ke/corporate/about-prisk/ on 2 September 2016
83 http://www.prisk.or.ke/faqs/faqs-members/ on 2 September 2016
84 Article 3, International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and 
Broadcasting Organisations (26 October 1961) 496 UNTS 43
85 Article 2, WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (20 December 1996) Miscellaneous Series No. 8 
(1997) Cm 3728
86 Article 2, Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances (24 June 2012) Miscellaneous Series No. 4 (2013) Cm 
8699
87 ‘About MCSK’, Music Copyright Society of Kenya, http://www.mcsk.or.ke/index.php/about, on 5 January 
2017
88 ‘Who we are’, Kamp, http://www.kamp.or.ke/who-we-are/, on 5 January 2017
89 ‘About Kopiken’, Kopiken, http://www.kopiken.org/about/index.html on 5 January 2017
90 Lewinski S, ‘Mandatory collective administration of exclusive rights – a case study on its compatibility with 
international law’ UNESCO E-Copyright Bulletin (January-March 2004)
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Right to Property
Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) provides that everyone has 
the right to own property alone as well as in association with others and no one shall be 
arbitrarily deprived of his/her property. Kenya ratified this declaration,91 and even if it is not 
binding as a declaration, it is in some quarters considered customary international law.92 Article 
14 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ rights provides that the right to property shall 
be guaranteed and may only be encroached upon in the interest of public need or in the general 
interest of the community and in accordance with the provisions of appropriate laws. Kenya 
has signed and ratified the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.93 By virtue of 
Article 2(6) of our Constitution, any treaty or convention that we ratify as a country shall form 
part of our law.
The right to property is enshrined in Article 40 of the constitution of Kenya.94 Article 260 
defines what property includes.95
In Hellen Wachuka Njoroge v Attorney General and Nairobi City County,96the judge noted that 
the purpose of Article 40 is to protect private property rights, including the rights to acquire, 
use and dispose of property. When considering if one has been dispossessed of their property, 
the judge held that it is important for the claimant to first prove that the property is indeed 
‘property’ per Article 40. Thereafter, it needs to be shown that there has been a deprivation of 
91 ‘Treaties’, Kenya Law, http://kenyalaw.org/treaties/treaties/164/Universal-Declaration-of-Human-Rights, on 
13 January 2017
92 Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, see also ICJ’s Legal Consequences for States of the 
Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa)
93 ‘Ratification table: African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’, African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr/ratification/, on 13 January 2017
94 Article 40: (1)Subject to Article 65, every person has the right, either individually or in association with 
others, to acquire and own property— (a) of any description; and (b)in any part of Kenya (2) Parliament shall 
not enact a law that permits the State or any person –(a) to arbitrarily deprive a person of property of any 
description or of any interest in, or any right over any property of any description; or (b) to limit, or in any way 
restrict the enjoyment of any right under this Article on the basis of any of the grounds specified or 
contemplated in Article 27 (4). (3) The State shall not deprive a person of property of any description, or of any 
interest in, or right over, property of any description, unless the deprivation— (a) results from an acquisition of 
land or an interest in land or a conversion of an interest in land, or title to land, in accordance with Chapter 
Five; or (b)is for a public purpose or in the public interest and is carried out in accordance with this 
Constitution and any Act of Parliament that— (i) requires prompt payment in full, of just compensation to the 
person; and (ii) allows any person who has an interest in, or right over, that property a right of access to a 
court of law. (4) Provision may be made for compensation to be paid to occupants in good faith of land 
acquired under clause (3) who may not hold title to the land. (5) The State shall support, promote and protect 
the intellectual property rights of the people of Kenya. (6) The rights under this Article do not extend to any 
property that has been found to have been unlawfully acquired.
95 Article 260 provides that property includes: ...any vested or contingent right to, or interest in or arising from—
(a) land, or permanent fixtures on, or improvements to, land; (b) goods or personal property; (c) intellectual 
property; or (d) money, choses in action or negotiable instruments;
96 [2016] eKLR
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property. If a deprivation is shown, then it should be shown that the deprivation was justified 
and undertaken in accordance with the law with specific regard to article 40, which concerns 
due process. If all was in accordance with the law, then it must be considered whether the 
compensation requirement was met. The compensation should be found to be just, equitable 
and prompt.
Freedom of Association
Article 20 of the UDHR provides that everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly 
and association and that no one may be compelled to join an association. This is reiterated in 
Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), with the 
addition of the fact that no restrictions may be placed on the exercise of the right except those 
imposed in conformity with the law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of national security and public safety, public order, protection of public health or 
morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. Kenya has ratified the ICCPR, 
and so it forms part of our law.97 The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights provides, 
at Article 10, that every individual shall have the right to free association provided that he 
abides by the law. Furthermore, subject to the obligation of solidarity, no one may be compelled 
to join an association.
The freedom of association is enshrined in Article 36 of the constitution.98
The freedom of association, like the right to property is limitable. This is in the constitution at 
Article 24 and has been reiterated in cases such as Satinderjit Singh Matharu v Armajit Singh 
Gahir & 5 others.99
97 Orago N, ‘The 2010 Kenyan constitution and the hierarchical place of international law in the Kenyan system: 
a comparative perspective’ 13 African Human Rights Law Journal, 2013, 420, see also David Ndungo Maina v 
Zipporah Wambui Mathara, Bankruptcy Cause 19 of 2010, Beatrice Wanjiku & Another v the Attorney General 
& Another, High Court of Kenya at Nairobi, Petition 190 of 2011 
98 Article 36 provides: (1) Every person has the right to freedom of association, which includes the right to form, 
join or participate in the activities of an association of any kind. (2) A person shall not be compelled to join an 
association of any kind. (3) Any legislation that requires registration of an association of any kind shall provide 
that— (a) registration may not be withheld or withdrawn unreasonably; and (b) there shall be a right to have a fair 
hearing before a registration is cancelled.
99 [2016] eKLR
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Allowable Limitations on Rights
Under Article 24 of the Constitution, we find the allowable limitations on human rights, which 
apply to both the freedom of association and the right to property.100 These should be kept in 
mind when considering the nexus between the rights and the functioning of collective 
management organisations.
The Nexus
It is not too often that the connection between human rights and intellectual property interests 
is considered.101 When it comes to CMOs, whether or not rights holders should be compelled 
to join CMOs (from the angle of human rights) is no easy question.102 On one hand, mandatory 
membership goes a great way in guaranteeing the economic efficiencies CMOs are designed 
for.103 These economic efficiencies include the issuance of blanket licences, royalty 
distribution, reduction of negotiation costs and enforcement actions, which could be argued to 
actually be an enhancement of the right to property.104 On the other hand, mandatory 
membership bears the danger, in its strictest strains, of its capacity to preclude the rights holders 
from issuing individual licences for their works (an affront to their right to property), 
compelling participation in an organisation whose policies they might not want to have to deal 
with, policies which they might not legally or practically be able to challenge (an affront to 
their freedom of association), and also might require association with rights holders with whom 
they may not be willing to be affiliated.105 
Similar fears have been curbed with regard to trade unions, where it has been held that requiring 
employees to join trade unions to gain or retain employment (the rights holders’ remuneration, 
which they would have to get through the CMOs, could be taken to be their maintaining their 
employment in producing musical/artistic/literary works) is a violation of freedom of 
association, and an impermissible one at that.106 In coming to such a conclusion, the employee’s 
100 24. (1) A right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights shall not be limited except by law, and then only 
to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including— (a) the nature of the right or 
fundamental freedom; (b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the 
limitation; (d) the need to ensure that the enjoyment of rights and fundamental freedoms by any individual does 
not prejudice the rights and fundamental freedoms of others; and (e) the relation between the limitation and its 
purpose and whether there are less restrictive means to achieve the purpose
101 Helfer L, ‘Collective management of copyrights and human rights: an uneasy alliance revisited’ in Gervais D 
(ed) Collective management of copyright and related rights 2nd ed, Kluwer Law International, 2010, 76
102 Helfer L, ‘Collective management of copyrights and human rights: an uneasy alliance revisited’, 93
103 Helfer L, ‘Collective management of copyrights and human rights: an uneasy alliance revisited’, 93
104 Helfer L, ‘Collective management of copyrights and human rights: an uneasy alliance revisited’, 93 
105 Helfer L, ‘Collective management of copyrights and human rights: an uneasy alliance revisited’, 93
106 Helfer L, ‘Collective management of copyrights and human rights: an uneasy alliance revisited’, 93
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freedom of association is weighed against the competing interests of the individual and 
community as a whole.107
It has been argued that in developing countries, it might be necessary to have such a 
concentrated government effort as compulsory/mandatory collective rights administration to 
boost the creative industry as the industry is smaller, less experienced and much more lacking 
in income.108 This limitation of the freedom of association may be necessary, even if for a time, 
in order to boost the creative economy in a more centralised, concentrated way.109 Indeed the 
mandatory membership is a constraint on freedom of association, but can be justified with 
regard to the need to create a national copyright culture and distribute royalties effectively in a 
developing nation on a balance of interests.110 
The more developed the creative sector is in a country, the harder it gets to justify mandatory 
collective administration of rights.111 It is also argued that people might join anyway, even if it 
was not mandatory, due to the obvious benefits of collective management of rights, and 
compelling them to join is overreaching.112
The emergence of online licensing of copyrighted works (technological) as well as legal 
developments have brought the matter of compulsory collective administration vis-à-vis human 
rights to the fore.113 The ease with which digital communications can be carried out as well as 
the increasing labelling of works with rights management information have made it easier for 
rights holders to carry out individual negotiation and licensing of their works, enhancing their 
right to property and protecting their freedom of association.114 
Conversely, this increased ability to justify not having mandatory membership may also work 
with the reverse effect vis-à-vis human rights—at least for some groups.115 The ‘bigger’ rights 
holders may opt to leave and ask for higher prices which the CMO may not be able to negotiate 
for them, and global media companies controlling large portfolios of work may withdraw the 
works from collective licensing, and the one likely to suffer in both these instances would be 
the ‘smaller’ rights holder.116 If the possibility of non-mandatory collective administration of 
107 Helfer L, ‘Collective management of copyrights and human rights: an uneasy alliance revisited’, 93
108 Helfer L, ‘Collective management of copyrights and human rights: an uneasy alliance revisited’, 95
109 Helfer L, ‘Collective management of copyrights and human rights: an uneasy alliance revisited’, 95
110 Helfer L, ‘Collective management of copyrights and human rights: an uneasy alliance revisited’, 95
111 Helfer L, ‘Collective management of copyrights and human rights: an uneasy alliance revisited’, 95
112 Helfer L, ‘Collective management of copyrights and human rights: an uneasy alliance revisited’, 95
113 Helfer L, ‘Collective management of copyrights and human rights: an uneasy alliance revisited’, 95-96
114 Helfer L, ‘Collective management of copyrights and human rights: an uneasy alliance revisited’, 96
115 Helfer L, ‘Collective management of copyrights and human rights: an uneasy alliance revisited’, 96
116 Helfer L, ‘Collective management of copyrights and human rights: an uneasy alliance revisited’, 96
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rights poses a danger to the small rights holders’ having an adequate standard of living, 
mandating collective administration may be necessary and focus placed instead on regulation 
of the CMOs and accountability measures.117
Creative Commons licensing has also worked to question whether compulsory collective 
administration is really necessary. Creative Commons licences allow users to exercise some or 
all of a rights holder’s exclusive rights without remuneration, enabling more sharing of creative 
work.118 Not being able to license one’s work through Creative Commons may be seen as 
another affront to one’s right to property. A solution to this problem has been suggested to be 
non-exclusive assignment of work to the CMOs, enabling the rights holders to license their 
work elsewhere on other terms.119 A more nuanced answer would be having rights holders 
transfer their rights for some years to the CMO exclusively, or having them transfer their rights 
on a work-by-work basis, allowing them to freely negotiate on certain works.120
Conclusion
The matter of mandatory collective administration of copyright and related rights vis-à-vis 
human rights can be looked at in two ways. On one hand, it can be seen to truly enhance access 
and enjoyment of the right to one’s property through the reduction of transaction costs involved 
in accessing the benefits that accrue to one due to others’ exploitation of their property. The 
monitoring capabilities that CMOs have enable one to curb infringement of one’s intellectual 
property. It could, on the other hand, be an undesirable limit to one’s right to property through 
limiting what one can do with their creative works in terms of licensing and individual 
contracting. When it comes to one’s freedom of association things get even murkier. What is 
necessary, in my opinion, is for jurisdictions to weigh the costs versus benefits of a mandatory 
collective copyright and related rights administration system, the state of industrialisation of 
the country and the suitability of mandatory collective administration, examine what can and 
cannot be done within this framework of mandatory administration, and the more restrictive it 
would be on the right to property and freedom of association, the more likely it is to be 
unconstitutional. The limits to constitutional rights and freedoms should only be to the extent 
indispensable for the effectiveness of CMOs’ acting as tools for enhancement of enjoyment of 
intellectual property rights. In an ironic sense, you can only limit the right to property to the 
extent that it enhances the same right. Developing countries can justify these limitations to a 
117 Helfer L, ‘Collective management of copyrights and human rights: an uneasy alliance revisited’, 96
118 Helfer L, ‘Collective management of copyrights and human rights: an uneasy alliance revisited’, 96
119 Helfer L, ‘Collective management of copyrights and human rights: an uneasy alliance revisited’, 96
120 Helfer L, ‘Collective management of copyrights and human rights: an uneasy alliance revisited’, 96
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greater extent, but even so, these justifications may only be along the lines of creation of 
national copyright culture and ensuring royalty distribution. Proper regulation and 
accountability measures must accompany this.
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Chapter Three: The Section 30A Judgments
Introduction
Section 30A is an amendment to the Copyright Act that introduces compulsory collective 
management of performers’ rights. Considering the human rights challenges that come with 
compulsory collective management of copyright and related rights, it was unsurprising that the 
section was challenged in court as unconstitutional to the extent that it would seem to violate 
freedom of association and the right to property. 
I will examine two judgments in this chapter. One of these was delivered by Justice Mumbi 
Ngugi, another by Justice S.J. Chitembwe. I will attempt to analyse what they mean for Section 
30A going forward.
Xpedia Management Limited & 4 others v AG & 4 others121
Facts
Xpedia Management Limited and Liberty Africa Technologies Limited were companies 
engaged in the promotion and distribution of musical and artistic works through digital 
platforms. They were the first two petitioners. The other three are creators and performers of 
musical works. The first two petitioners entered into contracts with mobile phone service 
providers to provide musical works to the public in the form of downloadable content, and 
entered separate contracts with the creators and performers of musical works for use of their 
works. They would therefore pay the creators and performers of the musical works their part 
of the proceeds from the mobile phone service providers’ use of their works. 
However, with the introduction of Section 30A into the Copyright Act, CMOs began to collect 
the money from the mobile phone service providers on behalf of the rights-holders of the 
musical works. The petitioners argued that the section took away their rights and those of other 
related rights’ holders to collect payments from the users of their works. They averred that 
CMOs represent their members and therefore would collect remuneration due to non-members 
but not remit the remuneration to the non-members. This would, they said, compel non-
members of CMOs to become members in order to get their money, which is an infringement 
of their Article 36 freedom of association.  They also pointed out that CMOs retain a certain 
proportion of the funds collected on behalf of copyright holders regardless of what the 
copyright holder may want. This would create confusion, they argued, as Section 30A says that 
the single remuneration should be shared equally between the performer and producer. They 
121 [2016] eKLR
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said that KECOBO, having not given direction as to the collection and distribution of the 
payment violates their right under Article 47 of the constitution of Kenya to fair administrative 
action, resulting in overpayments and no clear mode of sharing and distribution. They point 
out that rights owners need to join each CMO to get remuneration under the particular class of 
rights which they seek to get remuneration for, which is quite taxing. They also highlight the 
fact that they did not assign all their rights to MCSK, nor did they cede their rights to contract 
with other parties. The terms that the 3rd-5th petitioners agreed with the 1st and 2nd petitioners 
allow them some control over their works, and they did not wish to have CMOs interfere. 
KECOBO, the second respondent, argued that no person or association could carry out the 
business of a copyright collecting society unless certified under Section 46 of the Copyright 
Act, and only KECOBO can issue these certificates. It reiterated that only KAMP, PRISK and 
MCSK were so certified. They also argued that they have been guided by Articles 11 and 40 
in certifying these CMOs as their major aim is to maximize the bargaining power of rights 
holders. 
PRISK argued that the agreements between the petitioners providing that the first two 
petitioners would collect royalties on behalf of the rights holders was illegal with regard to 
Section 46 of the Copyright Act as this was already within the purview of the CMOs. Being 
illegal agreements, no action could be founded on them nor could the court give effect to such 
agreements.
The respondents also argued that the mandate to collect royalties was not limited to just their 
members; they collect for all rights holders. There is therefore no requirement to become a 
member of a CMO to receive one’s royalties. They argue that collection through CMOs 
increases bargaining power as opposed to getting into individual engagements. They noted the 
situation prior to 2012 (when Sec 30A came in): producers could not get royalties through any 
provision of the law and performers’ rights were not recognized at all. Having each artist—
considering the number that doubled as producers or performers—negotiate with each user was 
argued to be untenable.
According to Safaricom, managing rights collectively is the only feasible way. 
Issue
Most pertinent to this paper, the petitioners argued that Section 30A was unconstitutional as it 
infringes Articles 36 and 40 of the Constitution. They also argued that Section 30A does not 
permit CMOs to collect royalties from users of copyright works. Another issue was whether 
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the 3rd, 4th and 5th respondents were exceeding their Section 30A mandate by collecting 
royalties from users.
Decision
The judge held that she found nothing in Section 30A compelling copyright holders to join 
CMOs (failure to which one would not be able to get royalties for their works).She insisted on 
the usefulness of Section 30A as she highlighted the impracticalness of having to go to each 
individual user to collect royalties. She therefore found that the Article 36 right to freedom of 
association was not derogated from by Section 30A.
As regards whether there was a violation of Article 40, the judge took into consideration the 
virtual impossibility of individual management of rights, and decided that there was no 
violation of Article 40 of the constitution. 
The judge also held that no violation of Article 47 of the constitution was made out. The judge 
noted, however, that KECOBO is to ensure accountability to both members and non-members 
for whom they collect royalties, and remittance of these royalties. 
Overall, no violation of constitutional rights was found.
At the time of writing, no appeal has been lodged.
Mercy Munene Kingoo and Lydia Nyiva Kingai v Safaricom Ltd & AG
Facts
The facts of this case are similar to those in the Xpedia Case. The petitioners were composers, 
producers and performing artists of musical work and they, through premium rate service 
providers (PRSPs), availed their work on the Skiza Tunes platform for download. Safaricom 
had been paying royalties for their work through the PRSPs. After the introduction of Section 
30A in 2012, Safaricom began to remit royalties (in 2015) to CMOs which had not been 
contracted by the petitioners. The petitioners therefore alleged that the agreement between 
Safaricom and CMOs infringed on their and other artists’ rights, and that Section 30A was 
irregularly and unlawfully enacted as there was no public participation (amounting to its 
unconstitutionality). The petitioners were not members of CMOs and did not intend to be. The 
petitioners also asserted that the CMOs, not being licensed under the Kenya Information 
Communication Act, to handle digital content such as that on the Skiza Tunes Platform, were 
ill equipped to deal with the situation. They alleged that Safaricom’s entering into an agreement 
with CMOs forced them (the petitioners) to be part of CMOs, contrary to their Article 36 
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freedom. It was noted by the interested parties that the distinction between this case and the 
case above was that as opposed to looking at just the constitutionality of the effects of Section 
30A, this case was examining the legality of the procedure through which Section 30A was 
enacted. They note that the process was rushed, with the introduction of numerous amendments 
(Section 30A being among them) on the 19th of December, 2012, and the assent to these 
amendments being given on the 31st of December, 2012. The issue of public participation was 
also said not to have been dealt with in the previous case. 
The respondents argued that the petition was res judicata as the matter was already discussed 
in the Xpedia Case. 
Decision
The judge in the instant case held that res judicata could not be applied generally in relation to 
interpretation of the Constitution or a statute. He held that this particular petition was not res 
judicata, and it could be raised on the grounds of lack of public participation and violation of 
constitutional rights.
The judge went to hold that there was indeed no public participation in the enactment of Section 
30A. He agreed with Justice Mumbi Ngugi that there was no requirement for artists to become 
members of CMOs in order to receive their remuneration. He argued that the effect of this was 
to mean that CMOs can only pay those registered with them, and that section 30A does not 
prohibit one from being paid through means other than the CMOs; that Section 30A does not 
in fact bring about compulsory collective management of related rights into our law. 
He rejected the argument that it was difficult to have individual management of rights, and his 
justification for this was the fact that Safaricom manages to individually handle its twenty 
million subscribers, as well as distribute dividends to its shareholders through their mobile 
phones.
The enforcement, rather than the wording, of Section 30A, seemed to be the problem for Justice 
Chitembwe. The first problem that Justice Chitembwe identifies is how the section was being 
enforced retrospectively, affecting agreements concluded before its enactment. The 
enforcement of it is such as to seem that royalties can only be accessed through CMOs, which 
should not be the case according to him. The right for one to choose how to access their 
royalties is being infringed. He also found the right of the petitioners to associate with PRSPs 
was being infringed. The judge compared this compulsory collective management to forcing 
employees to use a particular bank—the bank of the employer’s liking—to access their salary. 
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Limiting Kenyans to 3 CMOs, (supposing he was only referring to the 3 CMOs dealing directly 
with music) the judge held, is unconstitutional.
To the extent that Section 30A did not have the requisite public participation prior to its 
enactment and that it (perhaps unduly) limited freedom of association, the judge declared it 
unconstitutional.
Analysis
It was interesting that even though Justice Chitembwe was agreeing with Justice Ngugi on the 
fact that Section 30A does not require membership of the performers and producers, they were 
not coming from the same place. Justice Chitembwe meant that it was not mandatory to be a 
member of a CMO to get one’s remuneration as one could access other avenues of 
remuneration, and so get their remuneration from those other avenues. He continued to argue, 
in fact, that if one was forced to only get their remuneration from a CMO (whether or not one 
needed to be a member of the CMO to do so), this would be unconstitutional. Considering the 
allowable limitations on rights provided in Article 24 of the Constitution,122 it would have been 
useful for him to illustrate how exactly this would be unconstitutional. Justice Ngugi was of 
the thinking that indeed CMOs were the only way to get one’s remuneration—that there were 
no other avenues, but there was no danger to one’s freedom of association as one did not need 
to become a member of the CMO to get their remuneration—one could get their remuneration 
from the CMO as a non-member—a conclusion I analyse further in the next chapter.  She also 
found that Section 30A is no danger to one’s right to property, as after all she found individual 
management of rights impractical.
Both these judges had some significant flaws in their arguments. Justice Ngugi seemed to 
simplify the problem too much. It was not only a question of whether or not the performers, in 
the end, get their money (just from a different source)—the question of why this particular 
source of payment and its suitability for the task should have been more deeply explored. The 
amendment was a major one, and even if she would end up coming to the same conclusion, it 
would have proved very useful if she provided her rationale—in much more depth—for 
thinking the amendment acceptable. If she explored the suitability of compulsory collective 
122 24. (1) A right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights shall not be limited except by law, and then only 
to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including— (a) the nature of the right or 
fundamental freedom; (b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the 
limitation; (d) the need to ensure that the enjoyment of rights and fundamental freedoms by any individual does 
not prejudice the rights and fundamental freedoms of others; and (e) the relation between the limitation and its 
purpose and whether there are less restrictive means to achieve the purpose
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management of copyright and related rights with regard to Kenya’s creative economy’s status, 
Kenya’s general status of industrialisation and national copyright culture, her argument would 
have been more persuasive. If, for instance, she excused the section on the grounds of Kenya’s 
being a developing country, and provided some guidance for the time period over and 
conditions under which such compulsory collective administration would be necessary, this 
might have been a stellar judgment. 
Furthermore, the fact that Section 30A does not theoretically compel performers to be members 
of CMOs is not enough. PRISK, for instance, charges an administrative fee of 50% on royalty 
payments if claimed from non-members.123 This is exorbitant enough to, in practice, force one 
to be a member of PRISK anyway. Section 30A could be considered a de facto violation of 
freedom of association. It is encouraging, though, that she called for measures to ensure 
accountability of these CMOs if rights are to be managed collectively.
Justice Chitembwe’s decision was also problematic. The justification he used to support 
individual management of related rights is not the least problematic aspect of his judgment. 
That Safaricom can manage its 20 million subscribers individually is an insufficient analogy 
for the rationale of collective management of copyright and related rights. He, too, has fallen 
victim of oversimplifying the problem, albeit in a different direction. 
He also seems to question whether Section 30A calls for compulsory collective administration 
of related rights, even if it certainly does. The wording of Section 30A does not leave room for 
doubt—the use of the word ‘shall’ underscores this quite decidedly. Nonetheless, PRISK can 
no longer compulsorily collect Section 30A royalties. However, they can continue with 
collection of royalties they were collecting beforehand.
Conclusion
The judgments, coming to different conclusions, both have their significant shortcomings. 
These will be necessary to address in order to properly assess whether compulsory collective 
administration of copyright and related rights is necessary in Kenya and the attendant 
repercussions to the conclusion we come to on the matter. They have left a lot to be desired in 
properly determining the status of Section 30A in our country. The shortcomings of these 
judgments—what they failed to address, will be the matter of analysis in my next chapter. 
123 Email from Kivisi D, Head of Member Services at PRISK on 06 July 2016
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Chapter Four: Suitability of Compulsory Collective Management of 
Copyright and Related Rights in Kenya
Introduction
In this chapter, I will, in answering the weaknesses of the Section 30A judgments examined in 
the previous chapter, analyse Kenya’s suitability or readiness for compulsory collective 
management of copyright and related rights. I will be looking at factors such as level of 
industrialisation, state of the creative economy and regulatory regime available.
Kenya’s Level of Industrialisation/Development
Kenya is a developing country.124 This might excuse certain measures that might be taken to 
centralise control of the growth of certain aspects of the economy, at least until a certain level 
of development is achieved.125 That is, in order to build the national copyright culture, it might 
make sense to allow compulsory collective management of copyright and related rights, if only 
for a time. Often in developing countries, the funds (and even the participants) are simply not 
available to provide for a spontaneous development of the creative industry—coordinated 
governmental effort may be necessary to make things work.126 It is a collective effort towards 
development in a certain direction, towards the point where we can afford to do this otherwise.
Kenya’s Creative Economy
Copyright related industries contributed to about 5.4% of Kenya’s GDP, and slightly over 3% 
of national employment as at 2012.127 Our royalty collections contribute one of the highest 
percentages of GDP among ARIPO member states.128 We also have the highest number of 
CMOs among ARIPO member states, at 4.129 Kenya has been defined as the economic and 
creative economy hub of East Africa.130 It makes sense that there would be a need to harness 
these emerging strengths and give them a solid boost from the start, and at least for the start. It 
makes sense to put all the odds in favour of this part of the economy’s development through 
compelling collective management of rights. In looking at the state of Kenya’s creative 
economy, we are looking at the limb of Article 24 that requires us to examine the importance 
of such a limitation on the rights to property and freedom of association.
124 ‘List of developing countries,’ International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics General Assembly 2015, 
http://www.iugg2015prague.com/list-of-developing-countries.htm on 9 January 2017
125 Helfer L, ‘Collective management of copyrights and human rights: an uneasy alliance revisited’, 95
126 Helfer L, ‘Collective management of copyrights and human rights: an uneasy alliance revisited’, 95
127 World Intellectual Property Organisation, ‘Copyright + creativity = jobs + economic growth’, 2012, 2-3
128 ARIPO, Survey on the status of collective management organisations in ARIPO member states, 16
129 ARIPO, Survey on the status of collective management organisations in ARIPO member states, 17
130 The British Council, ‘Scoping the creative economy in East Africa’, 19
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Compatibility with International Law
Our compulsory collective management provisions have been interpreted, by some lawyers 
including Ms Judy Chebet who was mentioned earlier, as the introduction into the Copyright 
Act of Article 15 of the WPPT.131 Article 15 of the WPPT provides for performers’ and 
producers’ right to a single equitable remuneration for direct or indirect use of phonograms 
commercially or for communication to the public or for broadcasting. It further provides that 
the contracting parties may establish in the national laws that this single equitable remuneration 
will be collected from the users by the performers/producers of the phonogram or by both. In 
the absence of an agreement between the performers/producers and the users, the article 
provides that national law may provide the terms according to which the single equitable 
remuneration should be shared. 
Indeed, as Chebet pointed out, Article 15 of the WPPT did not envision the use of CMOs as 
middlemen. However, the wording of the article might leave room for the argument that as 
much as it might have been envisioning a particular direction, it did not exclude the direction 
that Kenya went. This direction (Section 30A) could have been excluded by stronger wording, 
such as “shall” instead of “may”. 
In considering Victor Nzomo’s suggestion that Section 30A be passed through the 3-step test 
under Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention, I will take each of the three elements and examine 
them:
a) exceptional circumstances: these could be taken to be the urgent need to develop the 
creative economy of the country 
b) no conflict with the normal exploitation of the work: it could be argued that 
compulsory licensing encourages exploitation of the work as the transaction costs that 
would complicate its exploitation both locally and internationally are significantly 
lowered
c) no unreasonable prejudice to the legitimate interests of the work: compulsory 
licensing could in fact further respect for copyright and related rights protection, and so 
protection of the interests of the work that the rights holder intended
However, Lewinski argues that mandatory collective administration of exclusive rights (which 
could be extrapolated to related rights) does not constitute any exception or limitation within 
131 Judy Chebet, ‘Section 30A of the Copyright Act: What’s That About?’ (Judy Chebet, 26 February 2014) 
https://judychebet.wordpress.com/2014/02/26/section-30a-of-the-copyright-act-whats-that-about/ on February 
19, 2016
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the meaning of the Berne Convention, TRIPS Agreement nor does it contravene the principle 
of minimum rights under the treaties.132 
Either way, I do not see international law proving an impediment to compulsory collective 
management of rights.
Regulatory Regime
For the proper working of CMOs, it is most desirable for there to be one society covering all 
persons holding the respective rights the society collects royalties for.133 However, what we 
lose in freedom of association we must make up for in regulation. The regulatory regime for 
compulsory collective management of copyright and related rights should encompass the 
licences that CMOs offer to users, relationships between CMOs and their members and the 
relationships among members.134 
KECOBO is to be in charge of regulating CMOs, with the ability to deregister CMOs that are 
not functioning adequately as CMOs, not acting in accordance with their Memoranda and 
Articles of Association or in the best interests of their members, or do not comply or no longer 
comply with the provisions of the Act.135 The “Competent Authority” referred to in Section 48 
of the Copyright Act – the Copyright Tribunal that has been appointed by the Attorney General, 
is responsible for handling disputes between CMOs and KECOBO. It can handle disputes such 
as unreasonable refusal by KECOBO to grant a certificate of registration to a CMO, 
unreasonable refusals by CMOs to issue licences, etc.136 
It can be seen that our Copyright Act alludes to some of these areas that a regulatory framework 
should cater to.  For instance, with regard to licences that CMOs offer to users, we have 
recourse in Article 48 in case a CMO unreasonably refuses to grant a licence. With regard to 
relationships between CMOs and their members, our Act provides that a CMO can be 
deregistered if it does not act in the best interests of its members and in fact that before a society 
is approved to act as a CMO by KECOBO, KECOBO should be satisfied that the rules and 
regulations of the entity are such as to ensure the interests of the members of the CMO are 
adequately protected. 
132 Lewinski S, ‘Mandatory Collective Administration of Exclusive Rights – A Case Study on its Compatibility 
with International Law’ UNESCO E-Copyright Bulletin (January-March 2004)
133 Goldstein P and Hugenholtz B, International copyright: principles, law and practice, 277
134 Helfer L, ‘Collective management of copyrights and human rights: an uneasy alliance revisited’, 91
135 Section 46, Copyright Act (No. 12 of 2001)
136 Section 48, Copyright Act (No. 12 of 2001)
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Nonetheless, it would be useful for a section such as 30A to provide more explicit guidance as 
to remuneration and how exactly royalties are to be decided on (for instance in the way that 
Article 15 of the WPPT suggested). I say more explicit because perhaps we have some guidance 
in the recourse provided if CMOs unreasonably deny licences (which could be due to 
disagreements as to royalty payments) but some rationale for coming to the amount of 
royalties/remuneration sought should be provided for if such power is going to be laid in the 
hands of CMOs. KECOBO’s supervisory role could also do with more detail.137 Matters such 
as what happens once a CMO is deregistered have not been adequately dealt with.138 Such 
explicitness would provide something to check the performance of CMOs against. 
If perhaps the Copyright Act could also be more explicit as to our country going the way of 
compulsory collective management of rights, this might help a great deal in regulation. What 
exactly compulsory collective management of rights means should be made clear. Certainly it 
means that royalties will be paid out by the CMOs, but does it mean that one needs to be a 
member of the CMO to obtain royalties? What about non-members who seek to obtain their 
royalties from the CMO—what level of administrative fees should they be subject to? How are 
rights holders to be identified? These questions should be easily answered within the body of 
the Act or through publication of guidelines.
It might also be wise to go in the way that a country like South Africa, with more or less similar 
circumstances to ours, has in creating a specific Act for the protection of performers—their 
Performers’ Protection Act.139 In doing so, we could incorporate provisions of the Beijing 
Treaty (not yet in force; Kenya has signed but not ratified) as concerns audiovisual 
137 Nzomo V, ‘Music, money and middle men: changing dynamics between collecting societies, rights holders 
and the public’, Centre for Intellectual Property and Information Technology Law, 22 January 2016 
http://blog.cipit.org/2016/01/22/music-money-and-middle-men-changing-dynamics-between-collecting-
societies-rights-holders-and-the-public/ on 13 January 2017
138 Nzomo V, ‘Music, money and middle men: changing dynamics between collecting societies, rights holders 
and the public’, Centre for Intellectual Property and Information Technology Law, 22 January 2016 
http://blog.cipit.org/2016/01/22/music-money-and-middle-men-changing-dynamics-between-collecting-
societies-rights-holders-and-the-public/ on 13 January 2017
139 Matu-Mureithi L, ‘Listening to Skiza tunes millions: section 30A of the Copyright Act unconstitutional ad 
role of collecting societies’, Centre for Intellectual Property and Information Technology Law, 22 November 
2016 http://blog.cipit.org/2016/11/22/listening-to-the-skiza-tunes-millions-section-30a-of-the-copyright-act-
unconstitutional-and-role-of-collecting-societies/ on 13 January 2017
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performers.140 The process towards this should involve stakeholders, to avoid the problems that 
Section 30A is facing.141
The development of a Pan-African plan for copyright and collective management, considering 
the similarity of circumstances of the countries, might be well in order, and an organisation 
such as ARIPO is well placed to undertake such a task.142
When it comes to actual performance of the CMOs on the ground, we see that whatever flaws 
legislation may have are even further compounded by the general shortcomings and high-
handedness of the CMOs. Complaints about CMOs in Kenya go back to as early as 1984, when 
there was uproar about unpaid licence fees.143 Some of these CMOs face claims of 
misappropriation of funds, and have on occasion been declared illegal entities.144 In fact, 
MCSK has been described as “the bane of musicians that has left artistes suffering as a few 
enrich themselves to a level that is truly despicable.”145 Musicians such as the late Achieng’ 
Abura and Elani have stood strongly in opposition to the questionable practices at MCSK.146 
Elani, a popular music group, on complaining about the amount of royalties they received from 
MCSK (Sh. 31,000) in what they deemed a successful year for them, hastily received Sh. 
300,000 from MCSK, which raised a lot of questions about what exactly was going on at 
MCSK.147 MCSK explained that this was compensation for not communicating certain 
140 Matu-Mureithi L, ‘Enacting a Performers Protection Act in Kenya: possible solution in post-Beijing Treaty 
era’, Centre for Intellectual Property and Information Technology Law, 25 November 2016 
http://blog.cipit.org/2016/11/25/enacting-a-performers-protection-act-in-kenya-possible-solution-in-post-
beijing-treaty-era/ on 13 January 2017
141 Matu-Mureithi L, ‘Enacting a Performers Protection Act in Kenya: possible solution in post-Beijing Treaty 
era’, Centre for Intellectual Property and Information Technology Law, 25 November 2016 
http://blog.cipit.org/2016/11/25/enacting-a-performers-protection-act-in-kenya-possible-solution-in-post-
beijing-treaty-era/ on 13 January 2017
142 Nzomo V, ‘Is lack of transparency and accountability to blame for poor performance by African CMOs?’, 
Centre for Intellectual Property and Information Technology Law, 5 September 2016, 
http://blog.cipit.org/2016/09/05/is-lack-of-transparency-and-accountability-to-blame-for-poor-performance-by-
african-cmos/ on 13 January 2017
143 Nzomo V, ‘Music, money and middle men: changing dynamics between collecting societies, rights holders 
and the public’, Centre for Intellectual Property and Information Technology Law, 22 January 2016 
http://blog.cipit.org/2016/01/22/music-money-and-middle-men-changing-dynamics-between-collecting-
societies-rights-holders-and-the-public/ on 13 January 2017
144 Mukei C, ’Who is behind Music Copyright Society of Kenya (MCSK) woes?’ The Standard, 20 November 
2015
145 Mukei C, ’Who is behind Music Copyright Society of Kenya (MCSK) woes?’ The Standard, 20 November 
2015
146 Mukei C, ’Who is behind Music Copyright Society of Kenya (MCSK) woes?’ The Standard, 20 November 
2015, see also Mukei C, ‘Which way forward for Elani, MCSK drama over unpaid royalties?’ The Standard, 2 
February 2016
147 Mukei C, ‘Which way forward for Elani, MCSK drama over unpaid royalties?’ The Standard, 2 February 
2016
33
inaccuracies in log sheets.148 Other artistes such as Ringtone have also stood up and rallied 
fellow artistes against MCSK for misappropriation of royalties.149 There is clearly a problem 
in regulation here. Supervision of CMOs needs to get a lot more stringent if we are to achieve 
anything by compulsory collective management of rights.
Other challenges faced by CMOs include lack of awareness on laws on copyright on the users’ 
part, their own unwillingness to pay royalties, piracy, and inadequate resources, both in terms 
of manpower and technology.150
The Alternative
We look at the alternative in order to answer the limb of Article 24 that provides that, in limiting 
rights, it should be considered whether there are less restrictive means of achieving the same 
goal.151 The alternative to compulsory collective management of copyright and related rights 
would be individual management of rights. Contracting with regard to copyright and related 
rights involves a number of transaction costs.152 These transaction costs include initial search 
costs as the user and rights holder try to find each other, bargaining costs with regard to 
acceptable royalties, monitoring costs and costs of collection of royalties, as well as costs of 
ensuring the contract is respected by non-contracting users.153 These costs are more often than 
not prohibitive, particularly in a developing countries such as ours, with 42% of people living 
below the poverty line.154 People will just not contract at all in some situations, in the absence 
of CMOs, particularly if you consider that the users would usually have to have many similar 
contracts with other copyright holders whose works they would want to use (and copyright 
holders with many users).155 This is significantly more costly than the blanket licence that 
148 Mukei C, ‘Which way forward for Elani, MCSK drama over unpaid royalties?’ The Standard, 2 February 
2016
149 Mukei C, ‘Which way forward for Elani, MCSK drama over unpaid royalties?’ The Standard, 2 February 
2016
150 ARIPO, Survey on the status of collective management organisations in ARIPO member states, 5
151 24. (1) A right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights shall not be limited except by law, and then only 
to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including— (a) the nature of the right or 
fundamental freedom; (b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the 
limitation; (d) the need to ensure that the enjoyment of rights and fundamental freedoms by any individual does 
not prejudice the rights and fundamental freedoms of others; and (e) the relation between the limitation and its 
purpose and whether there are less restrictive means to achieve the purpose
152World Intellectual Property Organisation, Collective management as a business strategy for creators: an 
introduction to the economics of collective management of copyright and related rights, 17
153 World Intellectual Property Organisation, Collective management as a business strategy for creators: an 
introduction to the economics of collective management of copyright and related rights, 17, see also World 
Intellectual Property Organisation, Educational material on collective management of copyright and related 
rights, August 31 2012, 19
154 ‘Kenya at a glance’ UNICEF, https://www.unicef.org/kenya/overview_4616.html on 10 January 2017
155 World Intellectual Property Organisation, Collective management as a business strategy for creators: an 
introduction to the economics of collective management of copyright and related rights, 17
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CMOs offer, with savings on both sides of the contract.156 Using collective management, which 
provides the same services at a lower cost, is therefore more efficient than individual 
management. Such savings are invaluable to a growing economy. 
On the flipside, collective management reduces the variety of licences one can negotiate, which 
might have been more advantageous to the parties and even provide further incentives for 
creativity.157 Furthermore, with a blanket licence, users license both works that they want and 
do not want, whether they like it or not—they have no freedom to choose to exclude the works 
they do not want, which might be deemed inefficient.158 However, if we were to have 
differential licences for different users, the users might actually be worse off because the prices 
paid would need to reflect the transaction costs involved.159
Compulsory collective management of rights could be justified for our country as our realities 
do not allow a good number of us the ability to undertake individual rights management 
profitably. The only compromise that might seem feasible for the moment would be allowing 
those who may wish to do so to opt out of the compulsory collective management of rights, 
and even that might need to be done with caution due to the dangers it may pose to the smaller 
rights holders, discussed earlier. This would be in line with the Article 24 requirement to 
consider the nature and extent of the limitations we allow. 
Conclusion
Kenya’s status as a developing country allows us some room with regard to our ability to justify 
compulsory collective management of rights, and it is further justified with regard to our visible 
potential in the creative sector, potential we would be wise to harness in its nascent stages. 
Compulsory collective management of rights is certainly a limitation of the freedom of 
association and right to property (even if some arguments could be made for its enhancing the 
right to property) and must come with strong enough regulation to, in a sense, soften the blow, 
and to be in line with any arguments of promotion of the creative economy. 
Moreover, for purposes of greater certainty, some amendments to the Copyright Act may be in 
order regarding regulation and even simply the state of affairs—that we are undertaking 
156 World Intellectual Property Organisation, Collective management as a business strategy for creators: an 
introduction to the economics of collective management of copyright and related rights, 17
157 World Intellectual Property Organisation, Collective management as a business strategy for creators: an 
introduction to the economics of collective management of copyright and related rights, 18
158 World Intellectual Property Organisation, Collective management as a business strategy for creators: an 
introduction to the economics of collective management of copyright and related rights, 18
159 World Intellectual Property Organisation, Collective management as a business strategy for creators: an 
introduction to the economics of collective management of copyright and related rights, 18
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compulsory collective management of rights and the terms under which we are doing so. These 
and perhaps other lines of argument are what would have been useful to see coming up in the 
Section 30A judgments.  A Performers’ Protection Act, as is the case in South Africa, might 
also prove very useful. 
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Chapter Five: Conclusion and Recommendations
Introduction
In this chapter, I will summarise the findings of my research. I will provide answers to my 
research questions and provide recommendations. 
The Nexus between CMOs, the Right to Property and the Freedom of Association
Even if not oft examined, there is a connection between CMOs, freedom of association and the 
right to property, particularly when it comes to compulsory collective management of copyright 
and related rights. Both the licences issued by CMOs and the distribution framework for 
royalties directly involve one’s right to property. With regard to licences, supervision of the 
CMOs on KECOBO’s part has proved to be too much on the lax side and the high-handedness 
of CMOs in dealing with people’s property has been widely reported. When it comes to 
compulsory collective management of copyright and related rights, there is an even bigger 
question as regards the right to property as this can be taken to at once be significantly limited 
and enhanced. The limitation comes about due to the lack of freedom one has to exploit their 
rights individually particularly through contracts, but the enhancement comes about due to 
significantly reduced transaction costs in obtaining remuneration; remuneration one might 
never had access to.
The freedom of association comes into play when we have compulsory collective management 
of rights. Rights holders are forced to associate with a particular CMO, and forced not to 
associate directly with users through other contracts for exploitation of their work. Compulsory 
collective management of rights necessitates a limitation of freedom of association, but it might 
be an allowable/justifiable limitation. It could be justified by the level of development of the 
country (with compulsory collective administration being more allowable in developing 
countries) which might call for centralised development of the copyright and related rights 
sector to adequately spur it on, considering certain attendant factors such as lack of funds and 
number of participants in the sector. Where compulsory collective administration is favoured, 
this trade off of rights for the sake of development must come with adequate regulatory 
measures. What was lost in freedom must be gained in regulatory control.  The limitation on 
the rights should only be to the extent indispensable for the CMOs’ acting as tools for 
enhancement of enjoyment of intellectual property rights. Where still in the line with the overall 
goal, options such as providing compulsory collective management of rights with the option 
for certain rights holders to opt out should be considered in order to limit the infringement of 
the relevant rights as much as possible.
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The Constitutionality of Section 30A
The question of the constitutionality of Section 30A has been examined in the courts, with the 
judgments proving less than satisfactory. In one court it was declared constitutional, and most 
recently it was declared unconstitutional in another court and compulsory collection of 
royalties from CMOs put on hold. Compulsory collective management of rights can be 
considered an allowable limitation of our constitution with regard to the realities on the ground 
in Kenya. These realities include Kenya’s status as a developing country (giving more 
allowance for the government’s intervention in certain fields to hasten their development), the 
nascent stages in which our creative economy is at, and capacity for proper regulation.
However, the matter of public participation raised in Mercy Munene Kingoo and Lydia Nyiva 
Kingai v Safaricom Ltd & AG, cannot be ignored. Section 30A was no minor amendment, 
which is what usually falls under the purview of Miscellaneous Amendments Acts. Article 118 
of the Constitution provides that Parliament shall facilitate public participation and 
involvement in the legislative business of Parliament, including its committees. Section 30A 
seems to have been rushed through Parliament. This is enough to declare it unconstitutional. 
It is also unclear what is to happen now that distribution of royalties under Section 30A has 
been put on hold. Some guidance on this would be in order, perhaps from KECOBO. 
Suitability of Compulsory Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights
Compulsory collective management of copyright and related rights, justifiable in developing 
countries for spurring on of the creative economy and national copyright culture, is allowable 
in the country. There is need, however, for some changes as regards regulation. Stronger 
measures need to be taken particularly when it comes to KECOBO’s supervisory role in 
checking CMOs’ high-handedness. There is also a need to make clearer our distribution 
framework for royalties—how rights holders are to be identified and paid, and how much is to 
be paid. This could be done through creation or revision of guidelines. Guidance on the amount 
of equitable remuneration to be paid is also in order.
Recommendations
The most major recommendations to be made, and the work for those who proceed in this line 
of study, is the creation of guidelines and clarification of laws to fill in the gaps present and 
highlighted previously in the Copyright Act and its subsidiary legislation. We need guidelines 
on equitable remuneration and fixing of royalties. We also need guidelines as to how rights 
holders are to be discovered and remuneration distributed to them. The reins are also to be 
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tightened on the CMOs, which is under KECOBO’s scope of duty, to ensure that these CMOs 
are not abusing their de jure monopoly position. 
Enacting a Performers’ Rights Act that clearly stipulates the status on licensing, collection and 
distribution of remuneration to performers would go a long way in promoting intellectual 
property rights in Kenya, which is a constitutional mandate. 
Public education on copyright and related rights would also help us better both rights holders’ 
and users’ interaction with copyright and related rights machinery such as the CMOs and laws. 
Emphasis should also be placed on members’ internal monitoring of CMOs and their holding 
the Boards of these CMOs to account.
Conclusion
The objectives of this research project were:
i) to analyse the constitutionality of Section 30A and
ii) to assess the suitability of compulsory collective management of rights in Kenya.
The research project has achieved its objectives and responded to the problems stated. With 
regard to the constitutionality of Section 30A, it was found that it is unconstitutional due to 
lack of public participation in its being enacted, but compelling a rights holder to join a CMO 
in order to collect equitable remuneration is justifiable in light of our circumstances in Kenya. 
With regard to the suitability of compulsory collective management of rights in Kenya, it was 
found that for now, collective management as opposed to individual management of copyright 
and related rights is most favourable to the development of our creative economy, and adequate 
regulation must be put in place to cater for the trade-offs we have made in terms of freedom of 
association and right to property.
Coming to the hypothesis:
The implied requirement by the Copyright Act at Section 30A that rights-holders must be part 
of CMOs to get their remuneration infringes the freedom of association protected by Article 
36 of the Constitution, and the right to one’s property under Article 40, but is allowable
The research project has tested and proved the hypothesis to the extent of its being allowable. 
However, as it was enacted without public participation, the section is invalid. 
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